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Hempelman: The Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the Taxation of Religious In

THE FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX ACT AND
THE TAXATION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Unemployment taxation and unemployment coverage
have been part of the American social welfare scheme for
decades. But recent changes in the extent to which states
must afford coverage-changes instituted by Congress-have given rise to controversies in practically every state
regarding coverage of employees, the majority of them
teachers, in non-public elementary, and secondary schools.
Prior to the 1976 amendments to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, states were not required to extend coverage
to that group, and employers of the group were not, therefore, assessed the usual unemployment tax. The 1976
Amendments may or may not have altered this situation.
This comment will explore the circumstances out of which
the controversy arose, examine the controversy and attempt
to resolve it in a manner both constitutional and faithful
to precedent.
THE FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX ACT

Even in the darkest days of the Great Depression,
when unemployment in America exceeded 25% of the work
force, most states had nothing resembling an unemployment compensation program. Faced with this problem,
Congress enacted Title IX of the Social Security Act of
1935,1 forerunner of today's Federal Unemployment Tax
Act.2 The Act imposed upon employers with eight or more
employees an excise tax for wages payable for services
performed during "unemployment" as defined in the Act.'
Further, the legislation permitted employers to remit their
tax liability to federally-approved state unemployment compensation programs; and by doing so, employers were able
to obtain credits of up to 90% against their federal tax
Copyright© 1980 by the University of Wyoming
1. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).

2. Hereinafter FUTA. See generally, Brief for Defendant, The Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod v. The Dept. of Labor, State of Illinois, No.
501-78 (Nov. 2, 1978) and 44 Fed. Reg. 64378 (1979) for further details
on the legislative history. For background on the topic in general see
articles and comments cited at notes 116 and 121, infra.
3. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 637 (1935). Neither the original Social
Security Act nor the FUTA subjected non-profit organizations to any
federal unemployment or "excise" taxes. This is because the definition
of "employment" excluded services performed in the employ of a religious,
charitable, educational or other income tax exempt organization.
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liability.4 To assist the states in establishing federal programs, Congress provided, in Title III of the Act, for
federal grants to pay for costs incurred in the administration of state unemployment programs which met federal
requirements as to coverage.' Thus, the incentive existed
for states to enact their own unemployment compensation
programs-albeit according to federal guidelines. Within
two years of the enactment of these provisions, each state
had established such programs for the out-of-work. And
although no provisions in the original statutes required
state laws to cover any specific class of employees in either
the public or private sector, state laws generally paralleled
the coverage and exemptions of the FUTA in order to obtain
the benefits of the tax credit provisions for local employers
and reimbursement of certain costs by the federal government.
These federal unemployment tax provisions remained
essentially unchanged for twenty years after their enactment. Beginning in the 1950's, however, a steady stream of
unemployment insurance legislation was introduced and
passed by Congress. In 1954, Congress extended tax liability
to employers with four or more employees, and also enacted
its own compensation program for federal employees.' And
in 1958, an unemployment compensation program was
enacted for ex-servicemen.8 The most far-reaching revisions
in the federal-state scheme, however, were enacted under
the Unemployment Security Amendment Acts of 1970.'
These amendments not only extended coverage to employers
of one employee,"0 but more importantly, added subsections
(6) (A) and (B) to the existing 26 U.S.C. section 3304 (a),
and also 26 U.S.C. section 3309 to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The new section 3304(a) (6) (A) required
state programs to cover, as a condition for approval, em4. 49 Stat. 639-40 (1935). These basic provisions have been continued under
the FUTA. See 26 U.S.C. § 3301 and 3302 (1979).
5. 49 Stat. 626 (1935).
6. See 26 U.S.C. 3304(a) (1979), (hereinafter § 3304(a) as amended, 1976,
for current requirements for approval.
7. Pub. L. No. 767, 68 Stat. 1130 (1954).
8. Pub. L. No. 85-848, 72 Stat. 1087 (1958).
9. Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 695 (1970).
10. 84 Stat. 696 (1970).
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ployees of non-profit organizations and employees of state
hospitals and institutions of higher education. 1 Section
3304 (a) (6) (B), however, provided that those entities must
be afforded the opportunity, set forth at section 3309 (a) (2),
to elect to reimburse the state for the actual unemployment
compensation payments attributable to them in lieu of
paying their "contributions" under the normal tax provisions
of the state law."
Lastly, but most significantly, subparagraph (b) of the
new section 3309 provided what amounted to an exception
to section 3304(a) (6) (A). It permitted the states to exclude from mandatory coverage services performed
(1) in the employ of (A) a church or convention
or association of churches, or (B) an organization
which is operated primarily for religious purposes
and which is operated, supervised, controlled or
principally supported by a church or convention or
association of a church;
(2) by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed
minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry
or by a member of a religious order in the exercise
of duties required by such order;
(3) in the employ of a school which is not an
institution of higher education."'
But even the expanded federal-state program proved
inadequate in the 1974-1975 economic downturn. In late
1974, Congress passed two temporary remedial laws. The
first, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of
11. 84 Stat. 697 (1970), codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a) (1) (1979). Note that
both before and after the 1970 Amendments, such services were not considered "employment" under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Section
3306(c) (8) expressly exempted from that term services performed in the
employ of a religious, charitable, educational or other organizations described in I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) exempt from income tax under I.R.C. § 501 (a).
However, the 1970 Amendments did extend unemployment insurance protection to certain employees of non-profit organizations and state hospitals
by making their coverage under state law a condition for providing all
other employers in the state with the existing credit against the federal
unemployment tax.
12. Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 698 (1970), codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a) (2)
(1979).
13. 84 Stat. 698 (1970).
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1974"' (similar to its predecessor, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 197115) further extended
benefits for individuals covered by the regular unemployment compensation programs. The second, the Emergency
Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974 enacted
a Special Unemployment Assistance or "SUA" Program"
covering an estimated 12 million workers not otherwise
covered by unemployment compensation laws, e.g., state
and local government employees, agricultural workers and
domestic employees. 7 The program was administered by
state unemployment compensation agencies as agents for
the Secretary of Labor. The federal government assumed
the costs and benefits of program administration."8
The SUA Program was, in effect, later replaced by
the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976."
These amendments were designed to provide permanent
coverage for substantially all the nation's wage and salary
earners." But most significantly, the 1976 amendments
eliminated the section 3309(b) (3) exclusion which had
allowed the states to exclude from coverage services performed in the employ of non-profit elementary and secondary
schools which had been added in 1970 as section 3309 (b) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
On August 14, 1979, Secretary of Labor Marshall
issued notice to appropriate agencies in the states of
Alabama, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee, Texas and Washington indicating that their state laws "appear(ed) not to
be in conformity with the provisions of the ... federal law
provisions (sic)."" The states, according to the Secretary,
had erroneously construed section 3309(b) (1) to exclude
from mandatory state coverage employees of church related
14.
15.
16.
17.

Pub. L. No. 98-572, 88 Stat. 1869 (1974).
Pub. L. No. 92-224, 85 Stat. 811 (1971).
Pub. L. No. 93-567, 88 Stat. 1845 (1974).
See H.R. REP. No. 93-1528, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in (1974)
4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6756, 6758, 6760-6768.

18. See § 202 of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of
1974, 88 Stat. 1850 (1974).
19. Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 (1976).
20. H.R. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
21. 44 Fed. Reg. 47,648 (1979).
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elementary and secondary schools, despite the recent deletion of subsection (b) (3). Each state, that is, maintained
that these employees were still either employees of a church
or employees of an institution operated primarily for
religious purposes.22 A "conformity hearing" was announced
in the notice, which would resolve the matter and indicate
which states, if any, were certifiable as of October 31, 1979
with respect to both tax credits and reimbursements for
the 1979 tax year.
The necessary implication of the Secretary's action is
that he has determined that section 3309(b), as amended,
requires state unemployment coverage of all private, nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, regardless of
religious affiliation. He has, in other words, made the preliminary determination that employees of non-profit religious elementary and secondary schools do not perform
statutorily exempted services, i.e., services in the employ
of either a church or convention or association of churches,
or services in the employ of an organization which is
operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported
by a church or convention or association of churches. 2
This interpretation of the interplay between section 3309
(b) (1) (A) and the repealed (b) (3) effectively deprives
these church-schools of the state unemployment tax exemption the states had hitherto presumed from the language
of (b) (1). The Secretary of Labor has, in fact, adhered
to this position, despite a recommendation to the contrary
22. 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (1) (1979).
23. See 44 Fed. Reg. 64,378 (1979). In his decision the Secretary relied on
the fact that the legislative history of the FUTA supports the Department's interpretation that all church-related schools were intended to be
covered by the 1976 amendments. He also found no constitutional problems
with the Department's position, asserting that excessive entanglement
would not occur as a result of the stance.
Supportive, in part, of his argument against excessive entanglement
was the observation that "the unemployment insurance system would
generally only be triggered after an employee had been terminated and
his or her connection with the school severed", a curious position since
certain entanglements will still arise regardless of that fact. This would be
so even if the reimbursement method were adopted. But see, as the Secretary
has noted, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Wolman v.
Walters, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); and Committee for Public Education v.
Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) for the proposition that the
entanglements must be excessive.
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by the Administrative Law Judge presiding at the conformity hearing which took place in late 1979.4
In the meantime, however, numerous churches throughout the country have brought suit against state unemployment taxation agencies which have acted in conformity with
the Secretary's position. Thus, what now exists is the classic
Catch-22 situation: if the states do not "cover," and therefore tax church-operated schools, certification is an impossibility; but if employers of such schools are taxed, the
taxing states open themselves up to the accusation that such
taxation is violative of the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. The problems that the states, and naturally
the Department of Labor, must face as this unsettling
situation lingers are discussed below.
THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE COURTS

The decision of the Secretary to move against Alabama
and Nevada in U.S. Department of Labor v. State of Alabama et al., discussed above, is currently being appealed
in the Fifth Circuit. And although the states of Washington,
Michigan, Tennessee and Texas were certified for 1979 in
exchange for an agreement to a continuance, it is virtually
certain that the Secretary will challenge those states, plus
others, as being out of conformity during the 1980 tax year.
On the other side of the coin, however, are those state
agencies which have interpreted state coverage and exemptive
legislation, the language of which was generally taken verbatim from the federal statutes, as exempting from coverage
teachers at novitiates and seminaries only"-in addition to
those who are church employees in only the most literal
sense, e.g., caretakers."6 Their adherence to this position has
24. The positions of only two states, Nevada and Alabama, were dealt with
in the Secretary's decision. On September 25, 1979, one day prior to the
hearing, the Secretary offered to consent to a continuance of the hearing
and to certify the states as in compliance in 1979 if the states would
agree to such a continuance prior to the commencement of the hearing.
On the morning of the hearing, Tennessee, Michigan, Texas and Washington so agreed and the hearings as to them were severed and continued
generally.
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (1) (B).
26.

See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (1) (A).
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given rise to a flurry of confrontations between churches
operating elementary and secondary schools and state industrial relations departments all over the country. Church
groups have taken to the courts in the states of Iowa, Georgia,
Oregon, Illinois, North Dakota and California, among others.
All judgments to date, possibly for political reasons, have
been given to the plaintiff churches.
The essence of the plaintiffs' positions is that they
should either be exempt from coverage, or if not exempted
by the language of the statute, that the statute is unconstitutional-an infringement of plaintiffs' free exercise of
religion. In Iowa, an administrative hearing officer's
opinion2" and also a concurring Iowa Supreme Court
decision" determined that the plain language of Iowa's
exemption statute excluded from coverage teachers at both
the Tipton Bible School and the Church of the Open BibleSugar Plum Tree Nursery School. Teachers at those institutions were said to have been "in the employ of a church
".
" The constior convention or association of churches. . ..
tutional issue was therefore avoided--cold comfort, of course,
to the Iowa Department of Job Service, which must now
choose between accepting the court's decision and incurring
the Secretary's wrath. In California, Grace Brethren Church
and Reverend David L. Hocking v. State of California" and
The Lutheran Church-MissouriSynod v. State of California
Employment Development Department3 1 were consolidated
into a single action in California federal district court. In
granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs the court also
relied on the first clause of the exemption guidelines set
forth in section 3309(b) (1) and reproduced at section
634.5(c) of the California Insurance Code.32 The court,
however, did not skirt the constitutional issue entirely; it
further justified its position by asserting that any other
27. Tipton Christian School, Hearing No. 78A-EL-108161-Y (Apr. 27, 1979).
28. Sugar Plum Tree Nursery School v. Iowa Department of Job Service,
285 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 1979).
29. See supra note 26 and IOWA CODE ANNOTATED, § 96.19(7) (a) (6) (a) (West
19).

30. No. CV 79-93 MRP (Sept. 21, 1979).
31. No. CV 79-162 MRP (Sept. 21, 1979).
32. CAL. INSURANCE CODE § 634.5(c) (West 1972).
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position would result in excessive entanglement by the state
in church affairs, the states otherwise having to determine
who is subject to the unemployment tax and who is not.
Excessive entanglement will be discussed infra.
The State of Oregon in Employment Division v. Archdiocese of Portland" appealed its case from a referee's
earlier decision that primary and secondary schools operated
by the Archdiocese were similarly exempt under the subsection of the Oregon statute34 relied on in California and
Iowa. But the Oregon court additionally relied on the statutory language excluding from coverage "an organization
which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which
is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported
by a church or convention or association of churches." 5 And
in The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. The Department of Labor, State of Illinois" the lower court avoided
any inquiry into the constitutionality of the state's "noexemption" stance by finding in the stipulated facts an
institution operated primarily for religious purposes and
supervised, controlled and principally supported by the
plaintiff church, as did the Oregon court. Such was the
decision,' despite an articulate and convincing argument
made by the State of Illinois to the effect that a) the
language of section 3309(b) (1) (A) and (B) was ambiguous; b) rules of construction should therefore apply;
c) the applicable legislative history indicated an intent to
cover parochial school employees; and that d) taxing them
would not run afoul of the free exercise clause."
States in such a position probably have only one shortterm option besides appeal. Although it is theoretically
possible that the states will ignore the courts' decisions and
instead act in conformity with the Secretary's decision, any
assessments would probably be ignored. There may be a
contempt of court problem, but the likelihood is small. The
33. 600 P.2d 926 (Ore. 1979).
34. OR. REV. STAT. § 657.072(1) (a) (A) (1977).
35. OR. REV. STAT. § 657.072(1) (a) (B) (1977).
36. No. 501-78 (Nov. 2, 1978).
37. Brief for Defendant, The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. The Department of Labor, State of Illinois, No. 501-78 (Nov. 2, 1978).
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more probable immediate result will be that the states will
honor the decisions of their courts vis-a-vis exemption since
the cases will probably be affirmed in any event. If the
Secretary's decision is affirmed, the states will simply lose
their tax credits and reimbursements.
This probability actually puts the "hot potato" in the
hands of the state legislatures; at this point the dilemma
probably lends itself more to a legislative than a judicial
forum. The problem, at the first level, is one of language:
state legislatures should take it upon themselves to define
just exactly who should be covered by the unemployment
scheme; this would obviate the possibility of courts having
to make that determination. On the one hand, the state
statute could be drafted to clearly mirror the Secretary's
latest interpretation. Churches operating elementary and
secondary schools might ignore assessments rwiade pursuant
to such provisions, but, in the face of the foreclosure proceedings that would likely follow, the singular constitutional
issue would simply have to be faced, both by the appropriate state agency and by the Secretary himself. This could
easily lead to conflicting decisions among states and/or
among circuits, and might ultimately have to be resolved
by the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the alternative "broadly exemptive"
statute could be drafted by the legislatures. This would, at
least at present, cause the states drafting such a provision
to lose their credit and reimbursement benefits. Those states,
following the lead of Nevada and Alabama, would then be
forced to challenge the Secretary's decision. This could
generate disagreement among circuits as to the constitutionality of section 3309(b) (1) as interpreted by the Secretary. At that point, the only way to go would be "up."
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE

1976 AMENDMENTS

Courts of appeal may, of course, circumvent the constitutional issue as well. They, like the many states, may
rule that the plain meaning of the statute exempts emPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980
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ployers of elementary and secondary parochial schools, and
the states from covering employees therein. Thus, the repeal
of section 3309(b) (3) would have managed to keep the
(b) (3) exemption intact by virtue of the still existing
(b) (1). This would be unfortunate.
The statute is not unambiguous. The ambiguity, however, arises not so much from the language of the statute
as from the abundant legislative history of the FUTA. It
indicates, if anything, a steady stream of legislation in
the direction of universal unemployment coverage. In other
circumstances, of course, the plain meaning of a statute,
without its legislative history, might alone be determinative,
or at least highly persuasive. But such is not the case when
the legislation is remedial in nature. With remedial statutes, special effort is (or should be) used to avoid technical
constructions of the statutory language and to construe the
language of the statute so as not to frustrate the manifest
purpose of the statute. 8 It is, in fact, not unusual to extend
the enacting words of a remedial statute beyond their literal
import and effect in order to effectuate the legislative will. "
Furthermore, the corollary to this notion is that exceptions
and exemptions in remedial legislation are to be narrowly
applied.4" The United States Supreme Court in Phillips, Inc.
v. Wallings has indicated that "(t)o extend an exemption
to other than those plainly and unmistakeably within its
terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive 41process and to
frustrate the announced will of the people.
Congress, as indicated in the more recent legislative
history of section 3309, seems to have intended the 1976
amendments to mandate coverage of all non-profit elementary and secondary schools. The House Ways and Means
Committee Report dealing with the 1970 Acts, which first
38. 324 U.S. 490 (1945). See also, Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388
(1960).
39. See Blankholm v. Fearing, 22 Minn. 51. 22 N.W.2d 853 (1946) ; Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 F.2d
209, 212 (4th Cir. 1967).
40. Brennan v. Keyser, 507 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied Keyser v.
Dunlap, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975). Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 338
(1960).
41. Supra note 38, at 493.
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mandated state law coverage of individuals employed by
non-profit organizations including institutes of higher education indicated that Congress intended to bring religiouslyaffiliated colleges within the range of coverage also.4" That
same House Report also indicated that the "operated primarily for religious purposes" language contained in section
3309 (b) (1) (B) should be strictly construed.43 This early
legislative history, however, does not clearly indicate what
subsection (b) (1) (A) was intended to embrace, unless the
assertion in the House Report that "the services of a janitor
of a church would be excluded but the services of a janitor
for a separately incorporated college, although it may be
church-related would be covered" should also be taken to
mean that an "employee" within the meaning of subsection
(b) (1) (A) should embrace janitors, caretakers, organists,
etc., only. Examination of the recent state decisions 4
indicates that subsection (A) has been relied on to rule in
favor of churches whose schools are not separately incorporated. Perhaps the courts took their cue from this House
Report; but no substantive reason exists why unincorporated schools should be given exemptions while separately
incorporated elementary and secondary schools should be
subject to mandatory coverage and taxation once the subsection (b) (3) exemption for "services performed in the
employ of a school which is not an institute of higher
education" is repealed.
The Committee Reports on the 1976 Amendments are
even more informative. The House Report indicates that
Section 115(b) also has the effect of requiring the
State to pay unemployment compensation on the
basis of services performed for all educational
institutions. Under the existing law, the State is
only required to provide coverage of services performed for institutions of higher education.4"
42. H.R. REP. No. 612, 91st
43. H.R. REP. No. 612, 91st
752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
44. Supra notes 27 and 28.
45. H.R. REP. No. 755, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969).
Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1969).
48-49 (1970).

See also S. REP. No.

Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1975).
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And the Senate Report on the Amendments reads in pertinent part as follows:
Employees of non-profit elementary and secondary
schools. The bill would require the state to extend
the coverage of their unemployment compensation
programs to employees of non-profit elementary
and secondary schools (present law requires coverage for employees of institutions of higher education). The provisions for nonpayment of benefits
during vacation periods to school employees of state
and local governments would also apply to employees of non-profit schools.4"
The same Senate Report also estimated the number
of new employees to be covered as a result of the repeal of
section 3309(b) (3) at 242,000." The trial brief filed by
the defendant agency" in the Illinois case notes, however,
that according to the 1977 edition of the Census Bureau's
Statistical Abstract of the United States there were 261,000
full-time teachers in non-profit elementary and secondary
schools, 150,000 of whom were in Roman Catholic schools.4"
This statistical data further indicates that the intent of
Congress was to have the states bring elementary and
secondary school teachers in non-profit schools under the
coverage of their respective unemployment programs, regardless of the fact that those teachers might be directly
employed by religious institutions, and also that the "primarily religious" language of subsection (b) (1) (B) was
not intended to include such employees.
Given this apparent intent, there remains to be resolved the arguments against the constitutionality of such
a broad remedial provision. If that obstacle can be cleared,
state legislatures will be less hesitant to adopt unambiguous
legislation reflecting the Secretary's interpretation of section 3309 (b), and therefore less hesitant to levy unemploy46.

S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
S. REP. No. 1265 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
48. Supra note 37, at 12.
49. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1977
ed.).
47.
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ment taxes against the class of employers presently the
subject of this controversy.
FREE EXERCISE AND CONGRESS' APPARENT INTENT
REGARDING THE 1976 AMENDMENTS

Assuming, therefore, an intent to embrace religious
elementary and secondary schools, the inquiry must turn
to whether coverage, and thus taxation, violates the free
exercise clause. The free exercise clause is the second of two
religion clauses in first amendment: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. .

..

""

An historical overview of the free exercise cases indicates what issues are deemed significant. First to be considered are tax cases. In the 1942 case of Jones v. Opelika,'
the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion held that a peddler's
and bookseller's license tax on Jehovah's Witnesses who sold
(consistent with their religious mandate) door-to-door did
not interfere with the exercise of religious beliefs. The
Court in Opelika indicated that "it is difficult to see in
such enactments a shadow of prohibition on the exercise
of religion or of abridgement of the freedom of speech or
the press . . . (i)t is prohibition and unjustified abridge-

ment which are interdicted, not taxation."" The Court,
however, reversed itself in 1943 when a change in Court
personnel led to a five to four decision on practically identical facts. Thus, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania8 the Court
held unconstitutional a license tax against the Jehovah's
Witnesses characterized by Justice Douglas as "a condition
to the pursuit of their religious activities."5' In contradistinction to the opinion in Opelika, the Court noted that "an
itinerant evangelist

. . .

does not become a mere book agent

by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his
expenses or to sustain him."55 And particularly relevant to
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

51. 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
52. Id. at 597.

53. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
54. Id. at 110.
55. Id. at 111.
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our present inquiry is the Court's observation that "the
license tax is fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope
of the activities of petitioners or to their realized revenues, '"
and that "the fact that the ordinance is nondiscriminatory
is immaterial,""7 i.e., it makes no difference that the ordinance embraces hucksters, peddlers and Jehovah's Witnesses
alike. This is obviously in contrast to exemption cases to be
discussed infra, scrutinized with an eye to possible establishmentarian traits; a recent exemption case, Walz v. Commissioner," in particular emphasizes the non-discriminatory
nature of the exemption upheld in that case. Furthermore,
Murdock is not without its permissive dicta. Without being
specific, the Court did indicate that it did "not mean to say
that religion . . . (is) free from all financial burdens of
government.""5
These free exercise cases directly involve taxation of
religious entities. The free exercise clause has, however,
been construed in a variety of cases, and the rulings in those
cases are perhaps the more instructive, given our present
problem. Three general rules now form the basis for all
analyses invoking the free exercise clause. First, it is always
necessary to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it
operates against a complaining party in the exercise of his
religion." This principle is emphasized in cases discussed
previously. However, the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder"'
also relied on this principle; there the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional, when applied to Amish children, a law
requiring minors to attend school until the age of sixteen.
The Court noted that
. . . the impact of the compulsory attendance law
on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is
not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin
law affirmatively compels them under threat of
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at
56. Id. at 113.
57. Id. at 115.
58. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
59. Supra note 53, at 112.
60. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
61. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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odds with fundamental tenets of their religious
beliefs .... It carries with it precisely the kind
of objective danger to the free exercise of religion
that the First Amendment was designed to prevent . . . they must either abandon belief and be

assimilated into society at large, or be forced to
migrate to some other and more tolerant region. 2
But the Supreme Court has, on the other hand, refused
to invalidate laws on free exercise grounds merely because
they operate "so as to make the practice of . . . religious

beliefs more expensive."6 That now famous phrase, coined
by Chief Justice Warren in 1961, was written into the case
of Braunfield v. Brown,64 which rejected a challenge to
Sunday closing laws by orthodox Jewish merchants who
closed their businesses for observance of the Jewish Sabbath.
Over a vigorous dissent by Justice Stewart," the Court
stressed that the Sunday closing law under attack was only
an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, that it did
not make unlawful any religious practices and that the
State has an interest in establishing a uniform day of rest.6"
The second principle emerging from the free exercise
cases is that coercion alone may be insufficient to sustain
a free exercise claim. That is, although the clause's protection
of religious beliefs is said to be absolute, religiously based
conduct has always been subject to regulation for the protection of society. 7 Thus, in the 1878 case of Reynolds v.
United States" the Court affirmed a polygamy conviction
over a Mormon defendant's religious objections.6 In a
similar vein, the Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts70 and Zucht v. King7 1 upheld a governmental system of
compulsory vaccinations over the objections of individuals
who resisted such vaccinations on a religious basis. A state's
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 218.
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
Id.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 607.
See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 653, 657 (1978).
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
See also discussion in TRIBE, supra note 67, at 853.

70.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).

71. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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child-labor law has also been upheld over the right of a child
to exercise his religion by selling religious literature."
4
73 Cantwell v. Connecticut,"
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
and especially the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner" suggest a third governing principle. That is to say, a government's secular purpose in passing legislation either directly
or indirectly affecting religion must be linked in a unique
way to the burden the government chooses to impose on
religion, if indeed it does; however compelling, a purpose
obtainable without burdening religion must first be pursued. In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh
Day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South Carolina
employer because she would not work on Saturday. Unable
to obtain other employment because she refused to work
Saturdays, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation
benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, which provided that a claimant was ineligible
for benefits if she failed, without good cause, to accept
suitable work when offered. The Commission denied Mrs.
Sherbert's claim on the ground that she would not accept
suitable work when offered. The Supreme Court, however,
held that this denial abridged the appellant's free exercise
of religion. As against the appellee's argument that a compelling state interest justified the provisions of the South
Carolina statute, the Court held that "even if the possibility
of spurious claims did threaten to deplete the fund and
disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative
forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights."7 7 The state in Sherbert
failed to meet this burden, and failing that, could only
argue in behalf of its refusal to make an exception for
religious objectors by arguing that the Adventists should
be treated the same way as everyone else." And although
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Supra note 53.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 407.
Id.
See TRIBE, supra note 67, at 853 n. 39.
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the later Walz case7 appears to have endorsed a sort of
"religious blindness" in the establishment and possibly even
the free exercise area, the Sherbert Court, assuming a
position undoubtedly still good law, was unwilling to regard
as consistent with free exercise this overly drastic manifestation of neutrality.
Application of these principles to unemployment taxation cases suggests that a statute compelling coverage, and
thus taxation, would be constitutional. The Secretary's
decision in U.S. Department of Labor v. State of Alabama
Department of Industrial Relations and State of Nevada
Employment Security Department points out,s" and the
writer agrees, that the punitive element apparent in Cant3 is absent from the unemploywell,81 Yoder" and Sherbert"
ment insurance scenario--or at least as absent as it was
in Braunfield. 4 Like Braunfield, the most significant adverse impact of the coverage will be that adherence to
certain religions may be more expensive than adherence to
others-an impact that would be felt by sectarian as well
as non-sectarian schools. And like Braunfield, a comprehensive compensation program would accomplish the legitimate purpose of seeing that unemployed parochial school
teachers have access to compensation benefits.
Wisconsin v. Yoder does, of course, eschew a governmental scheme that would potentially disrupt an entire
"way of life.""1 If taxation should, as many fear, mean
the demise of sectarian education, what then of the protections thought to be afforded by the free exercise clause?
The answer would probably depend on whether sectarian
education is tantamount to the Yoder "entire way of life."
Actually, survival of religion in America seems not to have
been dependent on the existence of parochial schools. The
Jewish religion is only one of many religions that has not
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Supra note 58.
See 44 Fed. Reg. 64,368 (1979).
Supra note 74.
Supra note 61.
Supra note 75.
Supra note 63.
Supra note 61, at 215.
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undertaken to establish its own school system, but the religion is far from becoming an endangered species. And
Catholicism survives in communities too small or too poor
to support Catholic primary and secondary schools. "Sunday schools" and "Vacation Bible Schools" operated by
various religious institutions purport to keep religion alive
among public schoolers. It is therefore doubtful whether taxation, if found to be too onerous, would spell the demise of
an entire way of life. Nevertheless, Justice Burger's formulation in Walz of the rule of "benevolent neutrality" vis a vis
religion 6 has the potential effect of extending a notably
affirmative hand toward religion and parochial education
in the United States, and of superceding the "entire way of
life" language in Yoder.
The second principle emerging from the free exercise
cases, that religiously-based conduct "remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society" has heretofore contemplated and been applied to situations in which health
and safety, and even such diffuse phenomena as the "welfare of society" are otherwise endangered. The analogy of
cases construed in light of this principle to the present case
is imperfect. There is, nevertheless, in Congress' undeterred
march toward full coverage, a recognition of the need in
the United States for extremely broad protection against
wage loss resulting from unemployment. Furthermore, regulatory measures such as those taken in Reynolds, Jacobson
and Zucht survived despite their direct impact on the practice of religion in America; unemployment coverage, however, would only affect religion in an indirect manner.
From the third principle cited above, the "least restrictive alternative/compelling state interest" mode of analysis,
one might also conclude that the Secretary's decision, and
state legislation reflecting this position, would be upheld in
the end. But this rule contemplates, as indicated, a situation
in which the attack on religion is direct-unemployment
taxation, to repeat, is arguably not. But note also that
86. Supra note 58.
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Congress has built into its scheme the reinbursement method
discussed previously87 which, in addition to being a precondition to certification, 8 affords employers of non-profit
institutions a comparatively non-restrictive procedure for
paying into state unemployment funds. As explained, an
employer electing the reinbursement method is liable only
for those amounts paid out to the employer's former employees in the form of benefits. Unless a claim is made by
an eligible employee, plaintiffs electing the reinbursement
method will not be required to pay any amount into the
state's unemployment fund." Thus, even if the taxation is
deemed by the courts to be a direct assault on religion, this
statutory uniqueness-the statute's non-restrictive aspectcould possibly save the legislation, assuming a compelling
state interest is found.
The evolution of the foregoing rules has not, however,
involved tax cases in a general way. The Court has always
demonstrated a reluctance to tax religious institutions, and
this trend may well continue, plausible and logical arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. A few cases have,
however, held that the failure to grant a tax exemption to
a religious entity is not unconstitutional. In Watchtower
Bible and Tract Soc. v. Los Angeles County,"0 a state personal
property tax was successfully levied on religious literature.
Later, in Parker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 a
foundation pursuing a substantially non-exempt purpose was
found not to be entitled to a section 501 exemption on taxable
income. The receiving of an exemption must still be con2
sidered a matter of grace, rather than a matter of right.1
Since Justice Burger in Walz called attention to Justice
Douglas' words in Zorach v. Clauson" to the effect that
"(w) hen the state encourages religious instruction . . .it
follows the best of our traditions . . .", it is possible to
87. Supra note 13.
88. Id.
89. This method arguably means that employers under the scheme are really
not being "taxed" at all.
90. 30 Cal.2d 426, 182 P.2d 178 (1947).
91. 365 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1966) cert. denied 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
92. Id. at 795.
93. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
94. Id. at 313-314.
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surmise that taxation of property held by churches used
for religious or charitable purposes may one day be ruled
unconstitutional. On the other hand, if, as Justice Burger
observes in Walz, there is "no genuine nexus between tax
exemption and the establishment of religion,"" especially
if the exemption is for property used solely for a religious
purpose, one wonders how a nexus between unemployment
taxation, the proceeds of which are used for the very secular
purpose of keeping former employees fed and clothed, and
the free exercise of religion could plausibly exist.
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT IN RELIGION?

Courts dealing with the unemployment taxation issue
have also been sympathetic to arguments against taxation
based on "excessive entanglement." That doctrine was initially articulated as a separate point made in the context
of establishment clause challenges, but has since begun to
surface in free exercise cases as well. The doctrine seeks to
protect both secular and religious authorities from interfering with one another's respective spheres of choice and
influence, lest both government and religion be corrupted,
the political system strained, and liberty of conscience compromised.96 Especially anathema are excessive government
surveillance of religious personnel and government resolution of internal religious disputes. 7
The doctrine is most clearly stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman," its companion case Earley v. DiCenso," and also the
0 Those actions were brought
1975 case of Meek v. Pittinger."'
to challenge the constitutionality of state aid to non-public
school teachers in the form of salary supplements. Eligible
teachers were to teach only courses offered in public schools,
using only materials used in public schools and were required to agree not to teach courses in religion.1"' In striking
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Supra note 58, at 675.
See TRIBE, supra note 67, at 865.
Id.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id.
421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Supra note 97, at 607.
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down the challenged statutes because of possible impermissible administrative entanglements, the Lemon Court
noted that
the legislature has not, and could not, provide
state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that
secular teachers under religious discipline can
avoid conflicts. The State must be certain, given
the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do
A comprehensive, disnot inculcate religion ....
criminating, and continuing state surveillance program will inevitably be required to insure that
these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected . . . These prophylactic
contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church. 0 2
...

Cases discussing unconstitutional entanglement do not,
however, hesitate to point out that the entanglements under
scrutiny must be excessive.' Having pointed out this qualification it should also be noted that procedures for surveillance and auditing of religious operations in parochial
schools have been upheld in two recent cases, Wolman v.
Walters'°4 and Committee for Public Education v. Levitt.' °5
The latter determined that if surveillance occurs primarily
at the governmental level and does not require interference
with the internal operations of the schools, the entanglement is not excessive.100
When the doctrine has been applied to the unemployment taxation problem, the result, more often than not,
has been to find an impermissible entanglement. ' The
California decision noted earlier relies especially heavily on
this principle.' °8 It observes that acceptance of the Secretary's position would require the states to determine who
is subject to the unemployment taxation and who is nota determination which might require constant supervision
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Supra note 97, at 619.
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
433 U.S. 229 (1977).
461 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
See 44 Fed. Reg. 64,380 (1979).
See supra notes 27 to 37.
See supra notes 30 and 31.
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on the part of the state to insure that exempt institutions
were maintaining their "primarily religious" character." 9
The decision, quoting Lemon, notes that this would "put a
public investigator (in) every classroom and entails a pervasive monitoring of these church agencies by the secular
authorities.' 10°
But on the other hand is the previously discussed
history of section 3309 and Congress' hope that "primarily
religious purpose" be construed narrowly in order to fulfill
the purpose of the FUTA. Actually, the type of monitoring
the California (and the Lemon) court fears probably need
never occur in the unemployment tax situation, even though
the Secretary has at one point said that to be primarily
religious a school must concentrate on religion "at least
50% of the time.""..1 It seems a simple evaluation of the
school's curriculum would be able to satisfy the Secretary's
50/50 test. True, secular subjects might occasionally be laced
with religious overtones as the above quote from Lemon
stresses, but it is also true that subjects and classes taught
in precisely this manner satisfy state legal requisites for
primary and secondary school accreditation. Curricula meeting state standards should not, therefore, be considered, to
use the language of section 3309, "primarily religious." And
since the act is not "primarily religious," the need for
supervision to determine if the institution is maintaining
its primarily religious character-in order, in turn, to retain
its exemption-would therefore be unnecessary. It is, in
other words, possibly a mistake to equate a "uniquely religious institution" for purposes of state aid to sectarian
education with "primarily religious" for purposes of section
3309(b) (1) (B). This analysis satisfies the legislative intent of Congress without running afoul of the entanglement
cases.
109. See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (1) (B).
110. Supra notes 30 and 31, at 11.
111. Id. at 10.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/10

22

Hempelman: The Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the Taxation of Religious In

1980

COMMENTS

693

THE FLIP SIDE: ARGUMENTS ASSERTED IN
SUPPORT OF THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION

Religious exemptions such as those currently being
threatened will never fall without a battle. Taken together,
the foregoing cases indicate that religious taxation may be
constitutional.
But having established this, one might then expect that
the constitutional position struck in the free exercise cases
dictates a correlative "no exemption" position when the
same problem is considered in terms of a possible violation
of the establishment clause of the first amendment; consideration of such a constitutional issue from the viewpoint
of both free exercise and establishmentarianism seems, after
all, quite logical. The argument that the very existence of
religious exemptions does much to suggest state involvement in the establishment and maintenance of religion has,
in fact, frequently been raised.
Proponents of religious exemptions nevertheless combat
the argument in a variety of ways. They assert, first of all,
that the exemption has the support of centuries of history.
Despite the general weakness of this argument, it is true;
such exemptions date back at least to the fourth century,
when Constantine, then in the process of establishing
Christianity as the state church of the Roman Empire,
accorded the privilege to church buildings and to land used
for ecclesiastical purposes. But religious exemptions actually
date back at least to early Biblical days: Genesis indicates
that when Joseph purchased the Egyptians' land for the
food he had stored during the "seven years of plenty," he
turned back to each Egyptian his land, and "made it a law
over the land of Egypt unto this day that (the) Pharoah
should have the fifth part (of the produce); except the
land of the priests only, which became not Pharoah's." 2
Church and state existed in close relationship in the
American colonial period; it was therefore natural that
112. Genesis 47:26. See generally PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND RELIGION 210
(1967); OAKs, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95 (1963); SMITH,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 285 (1972).
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churches, essentially agencies supported and regulated by
the government, should enjoy a religious exemption." 8 However, the custom of exempting church property continued
uninterrupted after disestablishment and the founding of
the United States,1 4 and exemptions were later given the
force of law by express provisions in state constitutions and
statutes."' The universality of the exemption for property
used exclusively for religious purposes". is at this point
scarcely open to doubt; constitutional or statutory provisions
for such exemptions exist today in all states and in the
District of Columbia.
The second justification given, slightly more convincing,
is that by granting an exemption, governmental entities are
merely carrying over to the religious realm a broader policy
-that of exempting enterprises which parallel those supported directly by government, such as education, hospitalization and relief of the poor." 7 This justification, however,
only makes sense to the degree that church functions are
humanistic but not purely religious; otherwise, the government would be subsidizing activities distinctly religious in
character which it, of course, may not do."' Despite this
recurring argument, the 1970 case of Walz v. Commissioner
of the City of New York," 9 already referred to, has established that exemptions for church property raise no substantial establishment problems, even if their activities are
purely and wholly sectarian. Furthermore, many state constitutions expressly authorize exemptions of church-held
property used for worship or other religious purposesalthough at the same time expressly prohibiting the dispen113. Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 COLUMBIA,
LAW REVIEW 969 n. 9 (1949).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The definition of a religion for purposes of taxation is beyond the scope
of this comment. But see Comment, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CODE: IS CALIFORNIA PLAYING FAVORITES WITH
and Merel, THE PROTECTION OF
CHURCHES?, 10 PAC. L. J. 225 (1978)
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE: A CONSISTENT UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGION UNDER

THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978).
117. See supra note 58, at 214.
118. The bedrock constitutional provision in this area was enunciated in Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) : "Neither a state nor the Federal
Government .. . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
" at 15.
prefer one religion over the other ...
119. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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sation of state funds in and for sectarian purposes. The
further distinction between exemptions and subsidies has
thus been drawn; the former is now, at least in the
prop20
"no-aid.'M
to
tantamount
erty tax area, considered
The third justification for granting tax-exempt status
to religious institutions is that the opposite result might
lead to more dire problems. That is, if the primary goal of
the prohibition on state establishment is to prevent constant
and continual entanglement between church and state,
elimination of the exemption would tend to expand such
entanglement. Such a move would give rise to the possibility
of tax valuation of church property, tax liens, foreclosures
and the "direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in
the train of those legal processes."'' Recent critics have,
however, called this justification "far-fetched," and suggest
that alternative use market values could surely serve as a
suitable, ideologically neutral touchstone, and that the rate
of the levy, applicable equally to all property, can be fixed
by purely secular considerations of municipal financial
needs and the ability of all taxpayers to bear particular
burdens of payment.'22 But as has been explained, unemployment taxation need not, under either federal or state
statutes, pose any threats of undue entanglement.
But despite the weak justifications for religious exemptions and their peculiar resemblance to subsidies, such tax
exemptions remain for the most part alive, well and constitutional. State courts were the first to uphold exemptions
for religious institutions, the issue having first been litigated
in the 1887 case of The Trustees of Griswold College v. State
of Iowa.' In that case the Iowa Supreme Court was called
upon to decide whether a tax exemption for church-owned
real property violated the Iowa Constitution. In upholding
But see Bittker, CHURCHES, TAXES AND THE CONSTITUTION, 78 YALE L. J.
1285 (1969), and KURLAND, RELIGI0N AND THE LAW (1962).
121. Warren, Krottennuker and Snyder, PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR CHAR120.

ITABLE, EDUCATIONAL, RELIGIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN'CONNECTICUT, 4 CONN. L. REv. 181,203 (1971); supra note 119, at 672-74.

122. Supra note 121, at 203.
123. 46 Iowa 275 (1877). See also
STATE 95 (1963).

KAUPER,

THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND
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the exemption the court observed that "the argument is that
the exemption from taxation of church property is the same
as compelling contribution to churches to the extent of the
exemption," but held that "the constitutional provision extends only to the levying of tithes, taxes or other rates for
church purposes, and that it does not include the exemption
from taxation of such church property as the legislature
' Later, in Garrett Biblical Institute v.
may think proper."124
Elmhurst State Bank, the exemption was also upheld in a
case in which a tax deed conveyed to the defendants was
declared void on grounds that the Illinois constitutional
provision forbidding the establishment of religion did not
forbid exemption from real estate taxes. The Court reasoned that the Illinois Constitution was not violated because
the corporate charter granted to the appellee which contained a provision for tax-exempt status "gave no preference to any religious establishment or mode of worship,
and made no religious test a qualification for any office
or public trust.'' 25
Opinions rendered by Justice Black in the famous
Everson and McCollum decisions, however, soon established
a pervasive "no-aid-to-religion" proposition that serves as
the basis for religion clause cases even today. In Everson v.
Board of Education"6 the Supreme Court for the first time
used the establishment clause to determine whether the use
of public funds allegedly conferred on religious activity
could survive constitutional attack. The decisions do not
deal with taxation or any exemption therefrom, but their
relationship to tax matters must be considered. Justice Black
borrowed from Jefferson the metaphorical "wall of separation between church and state," but in the final lines of the
opinion he held that "(the) legislation, as applied, does no
more than provide a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expedi12 7
tiously to and from accredited schools."'
124.
125.
126.
127.

46 Iowa 275 at 282.
331 Ill.308, 318, 163 N.E. 1, 4 (1928).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 18.
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There thus emerged from Everson--contrary to Garrett
-the notion that the establishment clause does more than
prohibit preferential aid to one rather than another religious
activity. It prohibits the use of public monies to aid all
activities essentially religious. A consistent position was
taken in the companion case of McCollum v. Board of Education, in which the Court held unconstitutional "released time"
for students in public schools to attend religious instruction
on school premises. '
Everson and McCollum would appear to have a direct
bearing on the propriety of religious exemptions. Exemptions, it cannot be denied, bear a striking similarity to the
"subsidies" discussed above, and the nature of the benefit
conferred in them seems closer on its facts to McCollum
than to Everson. Even so, the validity of the tax exemption
was in the pre-Walz years only questioned at the state level,
and then only a few times. The decisions, like the Walz
decision that would decide the issue once and for all, are
simply not faithful to Everson and McCollum. For example,
in Lundberg v. County of Alameda,'9 the California Supreme
Court ruled on the validity of a statute exempting parochial
school property from taxation. Anticipating Walz, but apparently ignoring the substance of Everson, the Court upheld
the exemption by virtue of a constitutional provision exempting a broader class of property, that used for charitable
purposes. And later, in General Finance Corp. v. Archetto,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the property tax
exemption for property owned by a religious institution and
apparently used for religious purposes exclusively."'
In any event, the tax cases give three justifications for
their position: first, the exemption is historically sound;
second, no direct subsidy to religious activities is being
granted; and third, a justification can be found in the social
benefits rendered by the religious institution. Walz merely
followed, or affirmed, this general approach by exempting
128. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ; see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
129. 46 Cal. 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956), appeal dismissed sub nom. Heisey v.
Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
130. 176 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962).
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church property on the ground not only that the granting of
such exemptions falls into the scheme of exempting nonprofit organizations whose "business" is charity, but also
because no direct subsidy is being granted by the state.
CONCLUSION

The unique problem that has arisen by virtue of the
repeal of section 3309(b) (3) and the relationship of that
repeal to section 3309(b) (1) is genuinely a serious one.
After having investigated the issue, however, one can
arguably make the following conclusions. First of all, the
contention that religious exemptions from unemployment
taxation are unconstitutional probably stands little chance
of success, even though Walz was narrowly drawn to address
religious exemptions for property used exclusively for religious purposes only. Secondly, but in contrast, claims made
by churches operating educational facilities and also by
state agencies such as the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations and the State of Nevada Employment Security Department that unemployment taxation is violative
of the first amendment free exercise clause is not, especially
in view of the narrow message of Murdock, entirely convincing. The later free exercise cases make the argument
for the constitutionality of unemployment taxation of
church-schools a strong one, and virtually compel the conclusion that the situation in Murdock is sui generis, not
precisely applicable to the dilemma presented by the recent
amendment of section 3309. Thus, exemption or no exemption, the statute is probably constitutional.
-The notion of taxing a religious organization undoubtedly strikes many as dangerous and unsettling. If,
however, one keeps in mind the purpose the tax actually
serves-mandating the payment of a sort of insurance
premium, in essence-the tax has a great deal to commend
itself. Final resolution of the issue consistent with the
Secretary's current position does, nevertheless, take us a step
further than the step taken by the Braunfield Court:
the final decisionmakers in this area may well feel that
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/10
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the decision to tax parochial schools somehow does more
than merely "make the exercise of religion more expensive."
Politics and policy rather than precedent, in other words,
may very likely control the outcome of the issue. Politics,
in fact, may dominate the dispute, with policy lagging along
as the justification. Taxation of religious organizations is
likely, after all, to be an exceedingly unpopular political
issue.
The states, in the meantime, are wedged between two
forces, American churches and the federal government.
Hopefully, the Catch-22 nature of the current situation will
give rise to a speedy resolution of the problem.
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